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NOTES
REDEFINING "COMMON CARRIER": THE

FCC's ATTEMPT AT DEREGULATION
BY REDEFINITION

Title II of the Communications Act of 19341 (the Co
Act) codified a number of requirements and duties appl
organizations that provide communication services and c

eral Communications Commission (FCC or Commissio
those duties. Title II2 has become the foundation for a vast network of

regulations imposed on common carriers in the communications indus
try.3 The definition of "common carrier" is therefore integral to th
workings of the Communications Act. The language of the Communic

tions Act itself sheds little light on the definition, as the term "common

carrier" is defined at section 3(h) simply as "any person engaged as
common carrier for hire."4 From this statutory language, the Commi
sion derives an equally unilluminating regulatory definition of a commu-

nication common carrier: "Any person engaged in rendering
communication service for hire to the public."5
The terse and somewhat circular definition of common carrier satis-

fied Congress. While debating how to regulate communication common
carriers, Senator La Follette declared "telegraph and telephone companies ... have a defined meaning in the law, and I do not believe it would
include anything else."6 Unfortunately, Senator La Follette's forecast
has not been sustained by time: the FCC claims that the supplied definitions are no longer useful.7

Since 1979 the FCC has been seeking ways to ease or entirely remove the requirements that Title II imposes on communication common
1. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 47
U.S.C. ? 151 (1982)).
2. Id. ?? 201-221, 48 Stat. at 1071-81 (codified at 47 U.S.C. ?? 201-221 (1982)).
3. See 47 C.F.R. ?? 21.0-69.611 (1986).
4. Communications Act ? 3(h), 48 Stat. at 1066 (codified at 47 U.S.C. ? 153(h) (1982)).
5. 47 C.F.R. ? 21.2 (1986).
6. 45 CONG. REC. 6976 (1910).
7. Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Servs. and Facilities
Authorizations Therefor, 77 F.C.C.2d 308, 359 (1979) (Notice of Inquiry and Proposed Rulemaking) [hereinafter Notice of Inquiry] (this proceeding will be referred to as the Competitive Carrier
proceeding).
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carriers.8 The FCC recently has proposed narr
Title II by redefining the term "common carri
currently regulated communication providers.9
Commission's effort to redefine the term "common carrier" and con-

cludes that such action contradicts the expressed intent of Congress
and creates confusion and uncertainty in the industry." The note in

tially examines the FCC's effort to achieve deregulation through redefin

tion,12 and reviews the historical development of the term "commo

carrier"'13 in order to determine who Congress intended to regulate und

Title II. Then, using guidelines established in recent Supreme Court d
cisions, the note demonstrates that the FCC's attempt to deregulate

redefinition exceeds its authority under Title 11.14 Finally, the note dis
cusses the policy problems that the FCC's actions present.15
I. TITLE II REQUIREMENTS

The regulations set forth in Title II can be divided into roughly
three categories: duties of common carriers, liabilities of common carri-

ers, and economic regulations. The Communications Act imposes the
duty on a common carrier16 to provide service "upon reasonable re-

quest"17 at rates that are "just and reasonable,"'18 "without unjust or unreasonable discrimination" or "unreasonable preference or advantage" t
any party.19 The liabilities of common carriers are set out in section 206
of the Communications Act,20 which provides a remedy for costs caused
by delay in the delivery of a message,21 costs associated with discrimina8. Id. at 309-11.

9. Id. at 363-68. See infra notes 101-110 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 140-147 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 156-162 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 58-94 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 118-155 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 156-162 and accompanying text.
16. Cases discussing the early common law development of these duties are listed infra
66-67.

17. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, ? 201(a), 48 Stat. 1064, 1070 (codified at
47 U.S.C. ? 201(a) (1982)).
18. Id. ? 201(b), 48 Stat. at 1070 (codified at 47 U.S.C. ? 201(b) (1982)).
19. Id. ? 202(a), 48 Stat. at 1070 (codified at 47 U.S.C. ? 202(a) (1982)). See Notice oflnquiry,
77 F.C.C.2d 308, 312 (1977) (sections 201 and 202 are standards by which the Commission determines the lawfulness of tariffs). A further duty created solely by the legislation concerns the relation

of common carriers to national defense. See Act of June 25, 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-659, 54 Stat. 570

(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. ? 210(b) (1982)).
20. Communications Act ? 206, 48 Stat. at 1072 (codified at 47 U.S.C. ? 206 (1982)).
21. See Jeremias v. Western Union Tel. Co., 78 Ga. App. 142, 144-45, 50 S.E.2d 797, 798-99
(1948).
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tion in service,22 attorney fees in court actions,23 and punitive d

Economic regulations govern the business relations of com
riers. For example, tariff regulations require common carriers t
tariffs25 with the Commission and also to make them available f

examination.26 The Commission must receive ninety days not
changes may be made to the tariff schedule.27 Upon submi
Commission may hold hearings to determine whether these n
are unlawful and void.28 Common carriers must also file fo
proval of new services, routes or transmission lines.29

The national emphasis on deregulation has focused public
on many of these economic regulations.30 Those who favor de
posit that these regulations inhibit the development of a compet

dustry by forcing carriers to disclose both tariff information an

expand or develop new routes to other providers, who not on
from advanced knowledge of competitors' plans, but can also

the legality of the submissions in lengthy and costly proceeding

also believe Title II's filing regulations impose high complianc
common carriers, which are passed on to the taxpayer and

sumer.32 Furthermore, they argue that the lack of flexibility in

discourages new entrants to the industry and allows collusio
existing carriers.33
II. THE FCC's DRIVE TOWARDS DEREGULATION

In 1979, the FCC initiated an inquiry into the benefits and m
22. In re Edwards Indus., Inc., 74 F.C.C.2d 322, 328 (1979).
23. See WSAZ, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel., 31 F.C.C. 175, 194 (1961).
24. In re Richard Johnson, 18 F.C.C.2d 679, 681 (1969). Title II as a whole has

preted as placing actions for negligence by common carriers within the jurisdiction of fe

Western Union Tel. Co. v. Junker, 153 S.W.2d 210, 211 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
25. Tariffs are "[s]chedules of rates and [rules governing the offering of services]

mon carriers." 47 C.F.R. ? 61.23 (1986).
26. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, ? 203(a), 48 Stat. 1064, 1
fied at 47 U.S.C. ? 203(a) (1982)). See 47 C.F.R. ? 61 (1986).
27. Communications Act ? 203(b), 48 Stat. at 1071 (codified as amended at 47 U
(1982)).
28. Id. ? 204, 48 Stat. at 1071-72 (codified at 47 U.S.C. ? 204 (1982)).
29. Id. ? 214(a), 48 Stat. at 1075-76 (codified at 47 U.S.C. ? 214(a) (1982)). See 47
(1986). Other economic regulations concern mergers, acquisitions, and other general

tices of common carriers. Communications Act ?? 211-221, 48 Stat. at 1073-81 (c
amended at 47 U.S.C. ?? 211-221 (1982)). See 47 C.F.R. ?? 31-35 (1986).
30. Hillman, Telecommunications Deregulation: The Martyrdom of the Regulated

79 Nw. U.L. REv. 1183, 1183-84 (1985). See Notice of Inquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d 308,

(discussing economic regulation of common carriers).

31. Notice of Inquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d at 313 (1977).
32. Id. at 358.
33. Id.
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of deregulating common carrier services.34 In
Proposed Rulemaking, the Commission observ
tions industry had changed greatly since passage
Act in 1934; in particular, technological innovati
duction of diverse and possibly competitive se
feared that Title II's regulations imposed unne
barriers to entry, thereby diminishing both the
able to the public and the possibility that a truly
would develop.36 Two methods of deregulation
was forbearance, which would allow the FCC in
frain from enforcing compliance with all but
tions.37 The second proposal was to redefine t
thus removing certain communication servic
ments altogether.38

Although the Commission realized that the

went further towards deregulation,39 the Comm
it planned to use forbearance.40 In its First Repo

mission "streamlined" the regulatory requirem
the Commission considered "non-dominant common carriers."41 Carri-

ers that lack sufficient market power to raise prices artificially or to dis

criminate against customers were classified as non-dominant carriers
and were required to satisfy only minimal Title II requirements.42 B
contrast, the Commission treated "carriers that have market power (i.e.

power to control price)" as dominant carriers, which continued to bea
the full burden of Title II regulation.43
34. Id. at 309.
35. Id. at 359.

36. Id. at 309.
37. Id. at 359-63.
38. Id. at 363-68.
39. Id. at 359.

40. The Commission has not explained why it chose to begin with forbearance rat
redefinition, and has noted only that it plans to deal with redefinition in future orders.

Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Servs. and Facilities Auth
Therefor, 91 F.C.C.2d 59, 62 n.7 (1982) (Second Report and Order) [hereinafter Second

41. Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Servs. and Fa
Authorizations Therefor, 85 F.C.C.2d 1, 50 (1980) (First Report and Order).

42. Id. at 20-21. See also 47 C.F.R. ? 61.12(e) (1986) (defining "Non-dominant carrie
43. 85 F.C.C.2d at 20. See also 47 C.F.R. ? 61.12(c) (1986) (defining "Dominant carri

The Commission commented that "[a] firm with market power is able to engage in conduct

be anticompetitive . . . . This may entail setting price above competitive costs in ord

supranormal profits, or setting price below competitive costs to forestall entry by new comp

to eliminate existing competitors." 85 F.C.C.2d at 21. It is interesting to compare thi

approach with the market-based definition by which the Commission posited that some se
not common carriers. See infra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
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In the Second Report and Order, streamlined regulation
to "permissive" forbearance. Resellers of basic terrestrial c

tion services were permitted (but not required) to cancel their

conduct their business arrangements on a private contrac
The Third, Fourth, and Fifth Reports and Orders extended
forbearance to virtually every common carrier determined
dominant.45

The Sixth Report and Order imposed mandatory forbearance. It
ordered all non-dominant carriers to cancel their existing tariffs and to

refrain from filing new tariff schedules.46 The United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which specifically declined

to examine permissive forbearance,47 held the Sixth Report and Order
unlawful in light of the language of the Communications Act.48 The
court noted that the Communications Act required every common carrier to "file with the Commission and print and keep open for public
inspection schedules showing all charges for itself and its connecting
carriers. "49

The court's literal interpretation of the statutory language has suggested to at least one commentator that judicial consideration of permis-

sive forbearance-and possibly even streamlined regulation-would yield
the same result.50 Thus, although still in force, the deregulatory technique chosen by the FCC has been stalled short of what the Commission
hoped to achieve.
In the meantime, the definitional approach to deregulation, which
the Commission promulgated in the first Notice for the Competitive Carrier proceeding, had not been abandoned. One year after the first Notice,
the Commission issued a Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, which
44. See Second Report, 91 F.C.C.2d at 73 (1982).
45. Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Carrier Servs. and Facilities Authorizations Therefor, 48 Fed. Reg. 46,791, 46,792 (1983) (Third Report and Order) (extending forbearance to "carriers providing service to domestic points outside the continental United States"); Policy
and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Servs. and Facilities Authorizations
Therefor, 95 F.C.C.2d 554, 557 (1983) (Fourth Report and Order) (extending forbearance to all
resellers and specialized common carriers); Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive
Common Carrier Servs. and Facilities Authorizations Therefor, 98 F.C.C.2d 1191, 1209 (1984)
(Fifth Report and Order) (applying forbearance to carriers affiliated with exchange telephone companies, to domestic satellites, to miscellaneous common carriers, and to digital transmission
networks).

46. Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Servs. and Facilities
Authorizations Therefor, 99 F.C.C.2d 1020, 1027 (1985) (Sixth Report and Order).
47. MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 765 F.2d 1186, 1196 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
48. Id. at 1195.

49. Id. at 1191 (quoting 47 U.S.C. ? 203(a) (1982)).
50. May, MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC: A Roadblock or Merely a Bump on
to Deregulation?, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 51, 58-59 (1986).
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again solicited comments on redefining the

Although adoption of the forbearance techniq
the Commission to issue any orders invokin
the Competitive Carrier proceeding itself,5

been fairly well articulated,53 and in fact
actions.54

Specifically, the theory suggests that the d

mon carrier should be based on the market
non-dominant provider would not be consider
this approach.55 This technique is similar to f
in that it completely removes non-dominan
ulation.57 To understand fully the significanc

nitional approach, it is necessary first

development of the term "common carrier.
III. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE TERM
"COMMON CARRIER"

The history of section 3(h) of the Communications Act begins in th

ports of Restoration England. In 1670, Lord Chief Justice Hale wro
that the ports of England were touched by three types of rights: ju
privatum (proprietary rights), jus publicum (the common interest), a
jus regium (the prerogative of the King).58 Lord Hale recognized th

possible conflicts among the three types of rights; in his explanation he
ranked each of them. He described the King's rights, jus regium, whi
should be understood as more analogous to the interests of a centralized

51. Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Servs. and Facilities
Authorizations Therefor, 84 F.C.C.2d 445, 517-19 (1981) (Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
[hereinafter Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking].

52. Burch, Common Carrier Communications by Wire and Radio: A Retrospective, 37 FE
COMM. L.J. 85, 103 (1985) (Commission's "end run" use of forbearance precluded consideration
the definitional issue).
53. See infra notes 101-110 and accompanying text.

54. See, e.g., Cox Cable Communications, Inc., 102 F.C.C.2d 110, 121-22 (1985) (using mark

power analysis to determine whether carrier should be treated as a common carrier); Internation
Competitive Carrier Policies, 102 F.C.C.2d 812, 829-30 (1985) (using market power analysis to de
termine whether Title II should apply to communication service).

55. Notice of Inquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d 308, 365 (1979).

56. See Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 84 F.C.C.2d at 463 ("Because both the 'defin

tional' and forbearance approaches seek ultimately to identify the carriers and services to which Tit

II obligations should apply ... the two approaches may actually be viewed as complementary sid
of the same coin.").

57. Notice of Inquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d at 363.

58. Hale, A Treatise in Three Parts, in 1 COLLECTION OF TRACTS RELATIVE TO THE LAW O

ENGLAND 1, 72 (F. Hargrave ed. 1787).
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government than as a proprietary right held by the King qua Ki
superintendent to the other two.60

The interaction between the two remaining types of righ
duced the concept of public interest in privately held busine

the operator of a wharf or dock was free to profit from his pro

interest, jus privatum,6' Lord Hale held that the jus priv
"cloathed and superinduced with ajus publicum. "62 Lord Ha

that the public right conflicted with and superseded the private

ports inasmuch as:

1. They ought to be free and open for subjects and foreigner
come and go with their merchandise ....
2. There ought to be no new tolls or charges imposed upon th
without sufficient warrant, nor the old inhanced ....
3. They ought to be preserved from impediments and nusances

may hinder or annoy the access or abode or recess of ships, and ve

and seamen, or the unlading or relading of goods.63

Lord Hale explained and developed the concept of a privat
affected by a public interest in his classic work, The Analysis
He wrote that actions arising under a theory of implied contrac
brought against "[p]ersons that undertake a Common Trust, "
common hosts, common "farriers," and common carriers.65 T
Hale's writings show two important aspects of a private busi
serves a public interest: the infusion ofjus publicum into an
private undertaking, and a duty to perform the service in a man
complies with public expectations.

59. For example, when explaining why seaports could not be erected without roya
Lord Hale commented that "the safety of the kingdom, the commerce of the kin

concerned in it. Merchants and seamen of all parts and quarters of the world are let i
dom publicly, and under the publick protection in a publick port; and consequently it
the extent of a jurisdiction palantine de novo to erect a publick port." Id. at 53.
60. Id. at 72.
61. Id. at 74-75.
62. Id. at 84.

63. Id. These duties are strikingly similar to those mandated for common carriers in
201 and 202 of the Communications Act. The Code dictates that "[i]t shall be the duty
common carrier engaged in interstate or foreign communication ... to furnish such comm
service upon reasonable request . . . . It shall be unlawful for any common carrier to
unjust or unreasonable discrimination in charges, practices, classifications, regulations, fa
services . . ." 47 U.S.C. ?? 201-202 (1982).

64. M. HALE, THE ANALYSIS OF LAW (1713).
65. Id. at 123. The duties of hotelkeepers evolved into an elaborate body of common law. See
N. COURNOYER & A. MARSHALL, HOTEL, RESTAURANT AND TRAVEL LAW 4-7 (2d ed. 1983)
(discussing the history of hotel common law). The duties of ferrymen remained closely tied to the
duties of other common carriers of goods and passengers. See T. CHITTY & L. TEMPLE, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CARRIERS OF GOODS AND PASSENGERS BY LAND, INLAND NAVI-

GATION, AND IN SHIPS *2, *8 (1857) (discussing duties of carriers "by land and inland navigation").

This content downloaded from 165.123.155.5 on Tue, 25 Jul 2017 15:46:46 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

508 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1987:501

English66 and early American jurisprudence67

mon carriers in the context of special liabiliti
were labelled as such. Although the liabilities

mained unsettled for some time,68 a working de
rier emerged as early as 1710.69 By the mid-1

coalesced into a standard. Tompson Chitty an

that:

To render a person liable as a common carrier, he must exercise the
business of carrying as a "public employment," and must undertake to

carry goods for all persons indiscriminately; and hold himself out as
ready to engage in the transportation of goods for hire as a business,

and not as a casual occupation pro hac vice. 70

This definition was widely accepted,71 and like all contemporary definitions of the term was based solely on the nature of the carrier and not on
the market positions of individual common carriers.72

Because the early common law definitions of common carrier as66. Pozzi v. Shipton, 8 Ad. & E. 963, 974-75, 112 Eng. Rep. 1106, 1110-11 (Q.B. 1838) (holding strict liability of common carriers to be the custom, and therefore the law of England); Buddle v.

Willson, 6 Term R. 369, 373, 3 Rev. Rep. 202, 206 (K.B. 1795) (cause of action against common
carriers held to be ex contractu); Forward v. Pittard, 1 Term R. 27, 33-34, 1 Rev. Rep. 142, 147-48
(K.B. 1785) (discussing common carriers' liability for acts of man, and holding common carrier
liable for damage to goods caused by an accidental fire); Aimes v. Stevens, 1 Strange 128, 128, 93
Eng. Rep. 428, 428 (K.B. 1719) (ruling common carriers not liable for "acts of God").

67. New Jersey Steam Navigation Co. v. Merchants' Bank, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 344, 381-83 (1848)
(discussing effect of special agreement on liabilities of common carrier); Pomeroy v. Donaldson, 5
Mo. 36, 38-39 (1837) (discussing liabilities of common carriers for negligence, gross negligence and
negligence of the customer); Bank of Orange v. Brown, 3 Wend. 158, 162 (N.Y. 1829) (discussing
liabilities imposed on common carrier by implied contract that it will carry goods safely); Eagle v.
White, 6 Whart. 505, 516-17 (Pa. 1841) (discussing time at which common carriers' liabilities are
discharged).
68. See J. ANGELL, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CARRIERS OF GOODS AND PASSENGERS, BY

LAND AND BY WATER ? 68 (1849) (special liabilities of common carriers unsettled from reign of
Queen Elizabeth to reign of Queen Anne).

69. Gisbourn v. Hurst, 1 Salk. 249, 250, 91 Eng. Rep. 220, 220 (1710) ("[A]ny man undertaking for hire to carry the goods of all persons indifferently . . . is . . . a common carrier.").

70. T. CHITTY & L. TEMPLE, supra note 65, at *14-*15 (emphasis in original). This language
is reflected in the discussion of communication common carriers in National Ass'n of Regulatory
Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630, 640-42 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 992 (1976). See infra
notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
71. E.g., R. HUTCHINSON, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CARRIERS ? 47 (1879); J. STORY, LAW
OF BAILMENTS ? 495 (1832); J. ANGELL., supra note 68, at ? 68. Hutchinson noted that "[t]hese
definitions are substantially the same and are adopted and used indifferently." R. HUTCHINSON,
supra ? 47 n.1. Courts also accepted the definition. E.g., Dwight v. Brewster, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 50,
55 (1822); Allen v. Sackrider, 37 N.Y. 341, 342 (1867); Gordon v. Hutchinson, 1 Watts & Serg. 285,
286 (Pa. 1841).
72. The FCC argues rather elaborately that the development of the term common carrier could
be looked at in economic terms. See infra notes 101-110 and accompanying text.
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sumed that the entity in question actually carried something,
commentators and courts struggled to incorporate telegraph a
phone service within the concept of common carrier.74 The

Supreme Court, for example, agonized over the characteristics of
phy, and finally concluded that although telegraph providers sho
be labelled common carriers, they were so analogous as to be he

same standards.75 By contrast, the California Supreme Court h
difficulty conceptualizing telegraph and telephone service as c
carriers. In language elegantly reminiscent of Lord Hale, the c
cluded that:

The rules of law which govern the liability of telegraph companies are

not new. They are old rules applied to new circumstances. Such companies hold themselves out to the public as engaged in a particular
branch of business, in which the interests of the public are deeply con-

cerned. They propose to do a certain service for a given price. There
is no difference in the general nature of the legal obligation of the con-

tract between carrying a message along a wire and carrying goods or
packages along a route. The physical agency may be different, but the

essential nature of the contract is the same.76

Although Congress did not immediately resolve the confusion concerning communication common carriers, it did enact the Interstate
Commerce Act in 1887, which codified the duties and liabilities of common carriers.77 Although the Interstate Commerce Act dealt exclusively

with railways, it is integral to the history of communication common
carrier law because it served as Congress's initial basis for regulating
communications78 and provided many of the definitions found in the
Communications Act.79

Through the Interstate Commerce Act, Congress created the Inte

state Commerce Commission (ICC), and in 1888 it gave the ICC t
73. See I. REDFIELD, THE LAW OF CARRIERS OF GOODS AND PASSENGERS, PRIVATE AND
PUBLIC, INLAND AND FOREIGN, BY RAILWAY, STEAMBOAT, AND OTHER MODES OF TRANSPORTATION ? 20 (1869) (describing the "transport from place to place" of goods and passengers as an
element of common carrier status).
74. Redfield, for example, divided his work into separate sections on carriers and telegraph. It
is notable that although Redfield did not consider telegraph companies to be carriers, he found them
to have almost identical duties. Id. at 398. See also I. BROWNE, THE ELEMENTS OF THE LAW OF
BAILMENTS AND COMMON CARRIERS 93 (1896) (stating that telegraph and telephone companies are
not common carriers).

75. Tyler, Ullman & Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 60 Ill. 421, 431 (1871). See also Leonard
v. New York, Albany & Buffalo Electro Magnetic Tel. Co., 41 N.Y. 544, 569-70 (1870) (holding that
telegraph companies are not common carriers, but are subject to similar law).

76. Parks v. Telegraph Co., 13 Cal. 423, 424-25 (1859).
77. Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887) (codified as amended throughout 49
U.S.C. (1982)).

78. S. REP. No. 781, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1934).
79. See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
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power to regulate telegraph companies.80 Cong
authority, however, only to those telegraph li
dized by the government. Congress did not di
graph companies as common carriers.81

The Mann-Elkins Act of 191082 resolved w
telephones were classified as common carrier

compromise bill completely reshaping regulation
ating the first court that would review only agen

gave the ICC regulatory control of telegraph a
The bill as enacted not only gave the ICC contr

it also decreed telegraph and telephone pr
carriers.85

Unfortunately, the bill did not define "common carrier."86 The
minimal floor debate concerning communications, however, helps to ex-

plain congressional intent. Representative Mann, who opposed extending regulation, argued that telegraph and telephone services were not
common carriers because they did not involve the transportation of passengers or property.87 Representative Underwood disagreed and argued

that "the telegraph line and the telephone line are becoming rapidly as
much a part of the instruments of commerce and as much a necessity in

commercial life as the railroads."88 Representative Bartlett, who proposed the amendment, further argued that "the messages that are trans-

mitted are property," and went on to recite those liabilities of
communication services that were identical to the liabilities of common

carriers.89 Representatives Underwood and Bartlett prevailed, and the
80. Act of Aug. 7, 1888, ch. 772, ? 3, 25 Stat. 382, 383.

81. Section 6 of this act required subsidized telegraph companies to file their business contracts
with the ICC, foreshadowing the complex tariff requirements later promulgated by the FCC. Id.
? 6, 25 Stat. at 384 (current version codified at 47 U.S.C. ? 9 (1982)).

82. Mann-Elkins Act, Pub. L. No. 61-218, 36 Stat. 539 (1910).
83. See B. SCHWARTZ, 2 THE ECONOMIC REGULATION OF BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY 1007

(1973).

84. 45 CONG. REC. 5533 (1910) (amendment to H.R. 17536 by Rep. Bartlett). The Senate
considered a wholesale adoption of the House amendment, id. at 6973 (statement of Sen. Dixon), but
instead deferred detailed legislation to the joint conference and adopted a shorter amendment acknowledging ICC jurisdiction over telegraph and telephone, id. at 6976 (statement of Sen. Dixon).
See also S. 6737, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. ? 11, 45 CONG. REC. 7273, 7283-84 (1910) (labelling telegraph
and telephone providers as common carriers).

85. Mann-Elkins Act, Pub. L. No. 61-218, ? 7, 36 Stat. 539, 544 (1910).
86. The Act does list services to be included in the term common carrier, but it does not provide a general definition of the term. Id.

87. 45 CONG. REC. 5533 (1910). See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
88. 45 CONG. REC. at 5534.

89. Id. at 5536. Representative Hobson said:

a telegraph message or a telephone message is property. But even if it were not the t
portation of property, there is no reason why a measure that regulates intercommunica
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House voted to include telegraph and telephone providers und
bric of "common carrier."90 Once again, it is important to no
focused only upon the nature of the carriers, and did not ex
market dominance of individual providers.

The Interstate Commerce Act, as amended by the Mann-Elkin
directly preceded the Communications Act of 1934.91 Althoug

islative history of section 3(h) of the Communications Act is

does not expressly define common carrier, the Conference Repor
that "the definition does not include any person if not a commo
in the ordinary sense of the term. "92 The facial circularity of c
rary definitions of common carrier suggests that there was inde
dinary sense" of the phrase,93 so that Congress did not believe i

to provide a precise definition. Indeed, comments of various
during floor debate uniformly suggest that Congress transf

meaning of the term common carrier intact from its use in the
Interstate Commerce Act.94
that regulates commerce, should not embrace these messages.... Messages are classified,
and are more easily classified than freight. The same underlying principle of reasonableness of rates apply [sic] to the regulation of both.
Id.

The analysis of Bartlett and Hobson mirrored the scholarly thinking of that period. See J.
ALLDREDGE, RATE-MAKING FOR COMMON CARRIERS ? 69 (1929) ("Telegraph companies belong
to a special class of common carriers. . . . They transmit rather than transport."); id. at ? 73 (telephones also special class of common carriers).

90. 45 CONG. REC. 5537 (1910).
91. The Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162, which created the Federal Radio
Commission and mandated regulation of radio, was also incorporated into the Communications Act.
However, the Radio Act did not address communication common carriers.
As previously mentioned, the Interstate Commerce Act did not provide a definition of a common carrier but instead merely described services that would be considered as common carriage.

Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, ? 1, 24 Stat. 379, 379 (1887) (current version at 49 U.S.C.
? 10102 (1982)). Workable definitions of the term common carrier were later provided by amendment and case law. See Regulatory Policies Concerning Resale and Shared Use of Common Carrier
Servs. and Facilities, 60 F.C.C.2d 261, 304-08 (1976) (Report and Order) (discussing use of the term
common carrier by the ICC and stating that ICC use was precedential for FCC purposes).

92. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1918, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1934) (emphasis added), reprinted in
[Current Service] Rad. Reg. (P & F) ?10:1011.
93. Legal treatises of the period continued to use the definition of common carrier that had
emerged in the mid-1800s: one who holds himself out indiscriminately as a carrier for hire. See,
e.g., W. ELLIOT, LAW OF BAILMENTS AND CARRIERS ? 122 (W. Hemingway 2d ed. 1929); E. GODDARD, LAW OF BAILMENTS AND CARRIERS ?? 191-192 (C. Cullen 2d ed. 1928). Congress took a
similar approach with the word "railroad" in the Interstate Commerce Act. See 45 CONG. REC.
5892 (1910) (statement of Rep. Mann) ("[A] railroad corporation is not defined in the act to regulate
commerce.").

94. See, e.g., 78 CONG. REC. 8823 (1934) (statements of Sen. Dill); id. at 10,313 (statement of
Rep. Rayburn). See S. REP. No. 781, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1934) (definitions in section 3 taken
from Radio Act, Interstate Commerce Act, and international broadcasting conventions).
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IV. MODERN APPROACHES TO THE DEFINITION OF
COMMUNICATION COMMON CARRIER

The legal definition of a communication common carrier has no
engendered a large body of case law.95 The few modern court decisio
adhere to the common law elements of common carrier. The Suprem
Court, for example, in determining that cable television systems co
not be forced into the role of common carrier, commented that "[a] com
mon carrier service in the communications context is one that 'makes a

public offering to provide [communications facilities] whereby all members of the public who choose to employ such facilities may communicate
or transmit intelligence of their own design and choosing.' "96

Over ten years ago, in National Association of Regulatory Utility
Commissioners v. FCC97 (NAR UC), the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit grappled with the issue of common
carrier status under the Communications Act. The court relied on com-

mon law notions of a common carrier's quasi-public nature in concluding
that a common carrier was one who both holds itself out indiscriminately
for hire by the public and transmits information exactly as it is given by
the client.98 A carrier need not, according to the NAR UC court, actually
serve the entire public, or even be of possible use to more than a smal
segment in order to satisfy the definition. Thus, in defining common car-

rier under the Communications Act, the court distinguished between
those that offer to serve all comers and those that "make individualized

decisions, in particular cases, whether and on what terms to deal."99
Although the Commission has used the NAR UC definition to determine common carrier status in some proceedings,100 the Commission has
not embraced NAR UC so wholeheartedly as to abandon its search for a
definition that might better suit its goals. The Notice which opened the
95. See Burch, supra note 52, at 102 (legal definition of common carrier a novel issue raised by
Commission's procompetitive policy).

96. FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 701 (1979).
97. 525 F.2d 630, 640 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 992 (1976).
98. Id. at 640-42. This definition has been well followed in later decisions. See, e.g., Computer
and Communications Indus. Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198, 210 (D.C. Cir. 1982); American Tel. &
Tel. Co. v. FCC, 572 F.2d 17, 24 (2d Cir. 1978).
99. NARUC, 525 F.2d at 641. See Wold Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 735 F.2d 1465, 1471

n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (pointing to this distinction as central to the common carrier concept).

100. Regulatory Policies Concerning Resale and Shared Use of Common Carrier Servs. and
Facilities, 60 F.C.C.2d 261, 308 (1976) (Report and Order), issued shortly after the NAR UC decision, used the NAR UC definition as determinative of common carrier status. The Commission's

reluctance to adopt NAR UC as the standard, however, can be seen in such proceedings as Detariffing
of Billing and Collection Serv., 102 F.C.C.2d 1150, 1155 & n. 15 (1986) (Report and Order), in which
the Commission mentions NAR UC in a footnote as one standard proposed by commentors to the
proceeding, and expresses neither approval nor disapproval.
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Competitive Carrier proceeding took issue with the emphasis in
on "holding oneself out indiscriminately" to the public.101 The
sion focused instead on the possible element of monopoly in
tion. Relying on English common law, the Commission noted

and other places "affected with public interest" had been
commerce, and were scarce enough to be potential sources o
income.'02 The Commission therefore proposed that a new

should focus on the situation of the provider within the marke
on the nature of the service itself.103

The Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking continued the Commission's disagreement with NAR UC 104 and sharpened the economic
theory set out in the first Notice.10o The Commission first observed that

much commercial regulation is economic in nature;'06 second, that the
regulations in Title II can be viewed as economic;107 and finally, that at
the time the Communications Act was enacted, telegraph and telephone
services essentially were monopolistic and thus ripe for statutory control. 08 The Commission deduced from these observations that Congress
must have promulgated Title II as a means of checking monopolistic
powers, and that entities subject to the regulations should therefore be
defined in terms of market power.109 Thus, the FCC concluded that a
common carrier under the Communications Act is an entity that is dominant in its market.110

The Commission's definition of common carrier is wrong for three
reasons. First, the definition contrasts markedly with the definition developed and used through two centuries of common law. This definition

looked solely at the nature of the service offered.'" Second, it contravenes Congress's mandate that common carrier be interpreted in an ordinary sense.'12 Third, the Commission's redefinition of common carrier is
101. Notice of Inquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d 308, 365-66 & n.86 (1977).
102. Id. at 364-65.
103. Id. at 365.

104. Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 84 F.C.C.2d 445, 467 (1981).

105. The Commission did note that many elements of the definition of common carrier
derived from the liabilities inherent in that status; however, it dismissed them as irreleva

purposes of the Communications Act. Id. at 468.
106. Id. at 448-50.
107. Id. at 451-52.
108. Id. at 459-60.
109. Id. at 465-69.

110. Id. at 465. The Commission acknowledged that this approach yielded the same r
forbearance towards non-dominant carriers. Id. at 463.

111. See supra notes 64-76, 87-90 and accompanying text.

112. Supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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not supported by any legislative history."13

When passing both the Mann-Elkins Act

Act, Congress was concerned over the monop

cation providers.114 The Commission's a

"[n]owhere in the legislative history did Cong
intention to extend this form of regulation t
without market powers"'15 is untrue. The leg

Mann-Elkins Act and the Communications
ices not connected to monopolies.16 Congr
and easily could have excluded them. Instea
date that "every common carrier shall" com
Title II.117
V. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF REDEFINITION BY THE FCC

If the Commission issues an order that formally adopts its m
power definition of common carrier, someone will surely challen
order. The federal court that reviews the order should reject any
ment by the FCC that the court should defer to the Commission
sonable construction of the Communications Act.

The starting point118 for judicial review of agency interpretation of

statutory language is Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defens

Council, Inc. 119 In Chevron, the Supreme Court considered the legality
of a definition promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency.120

113. See infra notes 114-117 and accompanying text. Cf American Fed'n of Govt. Employees
v. FLRA, 798 F.2d 1525, 1528 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("Where an agency's interpretation would deprive

statutory provision of virtually all affect, a court should not affirm the agency's interpretation absen

'legislative history of exceptional clarity,' " (quoting American Fed'n of Govt. Employees v. FLRA

702 F.2d 1183, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1983))).

114. See 78 CONG. REC. 8822 (1934) (statement of Sen. Dill) (detailing size of telephone monopoly); 45 CONG. REC. 5534 (1910) (statement of Rep. Underwood) (comparing telegraph and tele
phone monopolies to railroad monopolies).
115. Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 84 F.C.C.2d 445, 462 (1981).
116. See 78 CONG. REC. 10,315 (1934) (statement of Sen. Rayburn) (reciting percentages of
telephone and telegraph industry independent of monopolies); 45 CONG. REC. 6974 (1910) (letter
from J. Ware to Sen. Smith) ("there are as many independent as Bell telephones in the Unite
States").
117. MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 765 F.2d 1186, 1193 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (quoting 47
U.S.C. ? 203(a) (1982)) (emphasis supplied by the court). The FCC itself supported this position in
its brief in American Tel. & Tel. v. FCC: "The agency has no authority to ignore these commands,
even if market forces arguably are present which undercut the 'natural monopoly' justification for
regulation." Brief of Federal Communications Commission at 49-50, American Tel. & Tel. v. FCC,

572 F.2d 17 (2d Cir.) (No. 77-4057), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 875 (1978) (quoted in MCI Teleconmmunications, 765 F.2d at 1193).
118. See Kuehner v. Heckler, 778 F.2d 152, 159 (3d Cir. 1985).
119. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
120. Id. at 840.
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In the course of its analysis, the Court set out a two-step pr
"review[ing] an agency's construction of the statute which
ters."121 First, a court, using "traditional tools of statutor
tion,"'122 must ascertain whether "Congress has directly sp
precise issue at question. If the intent of Congress is clear, tha

of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give ef

unambiguously expressed intent of Congress."'23 Second, if

ing court determines that "the statute is silent or ambiguous w
to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether t

answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute

Chevron arguably "mark[s] a retreat from the close judicial

of agency decisions that had characterized the hard look do
vailing until Chevron. "125 However, the deference accorded
the second step of Chevron has not reduced judicial review
interpretation "to a hollow formality."'26 The second step
only if the first is not satisfied,'27 and in determining whethe
addressed a precise issue the courts are "not required to grant a
ular deference to the agency's parsing of statutory language or
pretation of legislative history."'28
121. Id. at 842.
122. Id. at 843 n.9.
123. Id. at 842.
124. Id. at 843.

125. Kuehner v. Heckler, 778 F.2d 152, 159 (3d Cir. 1985). But see Garland, Deregulati
Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 507, 552-53 (1985) (Chevron and State Farm can be harm
"Chevron need not be read as a retreat from the commitment to hard look review expressed
Court in State Farm. ").

In Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Corp., 463 U.S. 29 (1983

Supreme Court considered the National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration's recissi

passive restraint standard. Id. at 39-40. The Court held that:

the agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for
action including a "rational connection between the facts found and the choice made."..
[The reviewing court] must "consider whether the decision was based on a consideration
the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment." ... Normal
an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on factors wh
Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect

the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence befo
the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or t
product of agency expertise.

Id. at 43. As Garland points out, such a review is quite substantive in nature. Garland, s
548-49.

126. Note, Bursting the Bubble of Environmental Protection: Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural

Resources Defense Council, Inc., 34 DE PAUL L. REV. 757, 758, 800 (1985). See American Fin
Servs. v. FTC, 767 F.2d 957, 998 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Tamm, J., dissenting) (depicting majority as
"anesthetized by misplaced deference to agency authority"), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1185 (1986).
127. Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of Am. Trademarks v. United States, 790 F.2d 903, 908

(D.C. Cir. 1986).
128. Transbrasil S.A. Linhas Aereas v. Department of Transp., 791 F.2d 202, 205 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (quoting Rettig v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 744 F.2d 133, 141 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). See
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In Securities Industry Association v. Board
Supreme Court noted that "deference is not to
lates the significance of judicial review."130 In

plying Chevron's first step have followed the Cou
that "the 'deference owed to an expert tribunal c

into judicial inertia'. . . . [Reviewing courts] mu
administrative decisions that they deem incon
mandate.' "132

Determining the "precise issue" is the threshhold inquiry in apply-

ing the first step of Chevron. Because the FCC wishes to redefine the
term common carrier, the precise issue should be "how is a common car-

rier defined?"'33 The Commission, however, would rather phrase the
precise issue as "whether certain companies offering communication serv-

ices in markets where they lack dominance or market power should be
defined as common carriers and become subject to Title II regulation."'34

The Commission could then argue that, because Congress did not address this exact point, the courts should defer to the Commission's construction of the statute.

The Commission's phraseology should be rejected for two reasons.
First, in applying the first step of Chevron, the Court has limited its consideration to whether Congress expressed an intent on the definition of

the specific term at issue.'35 If Congress has expressed an intent on the
definition of common carrier, "that is the end of the matter."136 Second,
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 790 F.2d 289, 297 (3d Cir. 1986) (agency interpretation not given presumption of correctness accorded to congressional legislation).

129. 468 U.S. 137 (1984).
130. Id. at 142-43.

131. E.g., American Fed'n of Govt. Employees v. FLRA, 798 F.2d 1525, 1528 (D.C. Cir.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 790 F.2d 289, 297 (3d Cir. 1986); Miss
Andrews, 787 F.2d 270, 286-87 (8th Cir. 1986); Army Eng'r Center v. FLRA, 762 F.2d 40
(4th Cir. 1985).
132. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms v. FLRA, 464 U.S. 89, 97 (1983) (quoting American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 318 (1965), and NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 291-92
(1965)).
133. Similarly, in Chevron, the Court focused its step one examination on whether Congress
expressed an intent as to the definition of a "stationary source," 467 U.S. at 851-59, and in Securities
Industry, the Court focused its examination on whether Congress expressed an intent as to the definition of the terms "note" or "other securities," 468 U.S. at 149-54.

134. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, MAJOR MATTERS REPORT 40 (1982) (emphasis added).
135. See supra note 123 and accompanying text. Indeed, much of the criticism of Chevron stems
from the claim that by narrowing its scrutiny to one discrete section of the legislation, the Court

ignores congressional intentions expressed by the enactment as a whole. Stukane, EPA 's Bubble
Concept After Chevron v. NRDC: Who Is to Guard the Guards Themselves?, 17 NAT. RESOURCES

LAW. 647, 650-52 (1985).
136. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
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the FCC should not be allowed to bootstrap itself past the f
Chevron by creating an illusory confusion of policies, there
the deference accorded agencies in the second step.'37

The statute provides the first source for determining cong
intent as to the definition of common carrier.138 The Communications

Act's sparse definition of common carrier probably will not satisfy Che
ron's requirement for a clear expression of intent; thus a reviewing cou
should turn to the legislative history.139 The legislative history of sect
3(h) shows that Congress directly addressed the meaning of common car
rier and stated that it should be interpreted in the "ordinary sense of t
term."140 An ordinary sense of the term common carrier had existed f
almost three hundred years, from the courts of Queen Anne's Englandl4
to the treatises in circulation when the Communications Act was

passed.142 Throughout those three centuries the "ordinary me
common carrier looked at the nature of the service offered and not at an

individual provider's position in the marketplace.
It is a basic principle of statutory interpretation that the statutory

language be interpreted according to its use at the time the legislation
was passed.143 The legislators who enacted the Communications Act

137. See Southern Pac. Pipe Lines, Inc. v. Department of Transp., 796 F.2d 539, 542 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (plaintiff not allowed to bootstrap by creating confusing meaning to avoid plain legislative
meaning); Texas v. United States, 761 F.2d 211, 215 (5th Cir. 1985) (declining respondent's invita
tion to relax judicial review of agency interpretation merely because it was reasonable, and instead
applying first step of Chevron); see also Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA, 791 F.2d 959, 963 (D.C. Cir
1986) ("That the Congress' use of [a term] clashes somewhat with its allegedly primary goal ... i
not a fatal flaw in the legislative scheme.").

138. Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1053 (D.C. Cir.) (general principle of statutory construction is to look first at the statutory language, citing Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE

Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 666 (1986).

139. See Washington Hosp. Center v. Bowen, 795 F.2d 139, 143 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("[I]nquiry

into congressional intent [for first step of Chevron] encompasses both statutory language and legisla

tive history."); Donovan v. Rose Law Firm, 768 F.2d 964, 970 (8th Cir. 1985) (noting that reading

of statutory provision did not plainly indicate intent and turning to legislative history to satisfy first

step of Chevron).

140. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 1918, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1934), reprinted in [Current Service]
Rad. Reg. (P & F) ? 10:1017. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. See also Securities Indus
Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 468 U.S. 137, 149 (1984) (Statutory silence on definition of term

compels Court to "start with the assumption that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinar
meaning of the words used.")

141. Gisbourn v. Hurst, 1 Salk. 249, 250, 91 Eng. Rep. 220, 220 (1710). See supra note 69 and
accompanying text.

142. W. ELLIOT, supra note 93; E. GODDARD, supra note 93. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.

143. See Securities Indus., 468 U.S. at 150 (analyzing "ordinary meaning" of term as used by
the Congress that passed legislation being scrutinized); Livermore v. Heckler, 743 F.2d 1396, 140103 (9th Cir. 1984) (analyzing term according to usage at time legislation was passed); see also Proceedings of the Forty-Fifth Judicial Conference of the Dist. of Columbia Circuit, 105 F.R.D. 251,
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specifically pointed to the Interstate Commerce
definitions for section 3.144 When Congress deb

cations providers could be characterized as co
bated the nature of the service provided, not
individual entities.145 This debate illustrates Con
what was and what was not a common carrier.

Even today there is an "ordinary," if not exclusive meaning of th
term common carrier. The Supreme Court'46 and lower federal courts147
have continued to define "common carrier" by the nature of the service.
No one, other than the Commission, focuses on the market dominance of
individual providers.

The Commission may try to avoid the first step and proceed directly
to the deferential second step by arguing that Congress did not expressly

forbid defining common carrier by relative market power.148 This disingenuous reasoning ignores the tenet that it would be "absurd" to believe
"that Congress delegated authority to vitiate . . its intent."149 This reasoning also ignores the rationale for deferring to agency created definitions: that Congress has implicitly delegated responsibility to the agency

by leaving a "gap" in the legislation.150 There is no gap in the history of

section 3(h)-Congress has defined common carrier and the Commissio
cannot redefine it.

Finally, the argument ignores what Congress did and what Congress

continues to do.'51 In 1934 Congress drafted the Communications Act
330-31 (1984) (statement of James Fitzpatrick) (intent of the Congress that enacted legislation is
controlling).

144. E.g., 78 CONG. REC. 8823 (1934) (statement of Sen. Dill); id. at 10,313 (statement of Rep.
Rayburn). Cf Drummond Coal Co. v. Hodel, 796 F.2d 503, 506 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (using legislative history of prior enactments to clarify congressional intent, as directed by Congress), cert. denied,

107 S. Ct. 1593 (1987).
145. 45 CONG. REC. 5533-37 (1910). See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
146. FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 701 (1979). See supra note 96 and accompanying text; see also Production Workers Union v. NLRB, 793 F.2d 323, 328 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (using
Supreme Court precedent to determine intent of Congress).

147. E.g., National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630, 640-42 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 992 (1976). See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
148. See, e.g., Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 84 F.C.C.2d 445, 462 (1981). The Chevron Court did comment that Congress did not foreclose the possibility of the agency-promulgated

definition. 467 U.S. 837, 851 (1984). The Court, however, had already found that Congress had
expressed no intent on the specific issue and was analyzing, as part of the second step, whether or not

the agency definition was reasonable within the confines of what Congress legislated. Id. at 845.

149. Washington Hosp. Center v. Bowen, 795 F.2d 139, 143 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Montana v. Clark,
749 F.2d 740, 745 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 246 (1985).

150. American Cetacean Soc'y v. Baldrige, 768 F.2d 426, 433 (D.C. Cir. 1985), rev'd on other
grounds, 106 S. Ct. 2860 (1986).
151. Cf Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 468 U.S. 137, 153-54 (1984) (noting that
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in absolute terms: "any person,"'52 and "every common carrie
Commission has, in turn, pointed out the effect of this legislati
gress and asked it to modify the language.154 In spite of these r
as the District of Columbia Circuit noted in its consideration of the

FCC's actions, Congress has not modified the Commission's mandat
this field.'5
VI. PRACTICAL PROBLEMS CREATED THROUGH
DEREGULATION BY REDEFINITION

The Commission's attempt at deregulation by redefinition n
contravenes congressional intent, it is also unwise policy and m
vent implementation of discrete congressional goals. For examp
tion 310(a) of the Communications Act prohibits foreign owne
common carrier fixed radio services,156 including both the ear
tions157 used to communicate with domestic satellites and the d

satellites themselves.158 The stated congressional purpose of this p
tion was to preserve independent communications that would not b

ceptible to foreign influence, and Congress placed a "heavy bur

the FCC to carry out this goal.159 Under the Commission's new ma
oriented definition, however, neither earth stations nor domestic
are considered common carriers; therefore, the Commission has

the sale of U.S. satellite facilities to a foreign entity.60?
On another level, the FCC's new approach to defining comm
Congress did not originally adopt the approach promulgated by the agency, "and it has
that rejection ever since").

152. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, ? 3(h), 48 Stat. 1064, 1066 (c
amended at 47 U.S.C. ? 153(h) (1982)) (emphasis added).
153. Id. ? 203, 48 Stat. at 1070-71 (codified at 47 U.S.C. ? 203 (1982)) (emphasis add
154. E.g., Federal Communications Commission, FCC Legislative Proposals 5-8 (198
155. MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 765 F.2d 1186, 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1985
156. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, ? 310, 48 Stat. 1064, 1086 (co
amended at 47 U.S.C. ? 310(b) (1982)).
157. 47 C.F.R. ? 25.103(d) (1986).

158. "Domestic satellites" refers to satellites serving only points located inside the Uni
and its territories. Cf Establishment of Domestic Communications-Satellite Facilities by
ernmental Entities, 35 F.C.C.2d 844, 845 (1972). Service between points located in mor
country is coordinated by the intergovernmental organization INTELSAT, although t
States does favor allowing some privately owned service in the North Atlantic. Rein,

Adams, Frank & Nielsen, Implementation of a U.S. "Free Entry" Initiative for Transatlant
Facilities: Problems, Pitfalls, and Possibilities, 18 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 459, 4
[hereinafter Rein].

159. Heitmeyer v. FCC, 95 F.2d 91, 99 (D.C. Cir. 1937) (Congress has imposed heav

tions upon FCC to discover and prevent alien or improper control of radio broadcasting
See generally Rein, supra note 158, at 473-74.

160. Letter from James R. Keegan to Kenneth E. Hardman, Application File No. 13

This content downloaded from 165.123.155.5 on Tue, 25 Jul 2017 15:46:46 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

520 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1987:501

riers is confusing to those who are regulated. M
predict.161 An entity wishing either to enter a

its position in an existing market may not be

vance whether it will be subject to FCC regulati

is added by fluctuations in market power tha
common carrier only at certain times. Such u
flaw in any regulatory system.
CONCLUSION

The FCC faces an everbroadening array of new communications
services that fall within Congress's definition of common carrier. The

FCC also faces pressure from an economic theory that suggests that the
regulatory system applicable to common carriers will only inhibit these
new services. Heeding the cry of deregulation, the FCC has proposed to
achieve deregulation by redefining the term common carrier in terms of

market dominance. Only those carriers that can dominate the market
would be regulated as common carriers.
This note has demonstrated that the FCC's attempts should be rejected. When Congress enacted the Communications Act of 1934, it had
a specific definition of common carrier in mind. That definition, relating
to the nature of the service rather than the position of the provider in the
market, was based on the ordinary meaning of the term as it had developed over three centuries. It is possible that a new definition would bet-

ter serve an agency facing current economic and technological

developments.162 However, if the policies of Congress have become out-

dated or obsolete, Congress, not the FCC, is responsible for replacing
them.

Phil Nichols

L-82 (Sept. 23, 1982). See also In re Application of Satellite Business Sys., No. 1091-DSS-MP/ML83 (Nov. 2, 1982) (authorizing sale of satellite capacity to foreign entities).
161. Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 84 F.C.C.2d 445, 465 n.43 (1981). See Baxter, The
Definition and Measurement of Market Power in Industries Characterized by Rapidly Developing and
Changing Technologies, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 717, 720-21 (1984) (measurable market share of hightech industries may not reflect important research and development share of industry).

162. Cf Geller, Communications Law--A Half Century Later, 37 FED. COMM. L.J. 73, 83
(1985) (faulting Congress for failing to provide guidance in new fields of communication services).
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